ABSTRACT With the widespread popularity of cloud storage, cloud storage security issues have also received much attention. A provable data possession (PDP) scheme can effectively help users to verify the integrity of data stored remotely in the cloud. For this reason, the client's PDP scheme is constantly improving and developing. A non-repudiable dynamic PDP scheme based on the Stern-Brocot tree (Stern-Brocot-based non-repudiation dynamic provable data possession, abbreviated as SB-NR-DPDP) is proposed in view of the problem that the existing PDP scheme pays less attention to the clients deceiving the cloud server. We put forward a dynamic storage structure and dynamic operation algorithm based on the Stern-Brocot tree so that it can satisfy the client's dynamic data operations and realize the non-repudiation feature of the scheme. This scheme provides tag-unforgeability and proof-unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks. The scheme can also resist hash value attacks, delete-insert attacks, and tamper with cloud return value attacks. The theoretical analysis shows that the proposed scheme has less computing overhead and storage overhead. As such, it has better safety and efficiency than other schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cloud storage can provide users with high-quality data storage and computing services [1] , cloud storage has gradually gained wide popularity among users. Cloud storage not only provides convenience for users but also raises serious security problems for them [2] . Cloud storage not only makes users relinquish physical control of the data but also increases the risk of data being leaked by, tampered with and deleted by cloud service providers. In addition, the security of cloud storage is threatened by external attackers, hardware failures and other factors. Therefore, research on the integrity verification of users' cloud data is urgently needed.
A provable data possession (PDP) scheme can effectively help users to verify the integrity of data stored remotely in the cloud. However, research on PDP has paid little attention to user deception by cloud service providers. For example, a user once issued an order to delete a certain piece of data to the cloud service provider, but the user denied that order when authenticating the integrity and blamed the cloud service provider, resulting in disputes between the user and the cloud service provider. For this reason, by introducing the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zheli Liu.
Stern-Brocot tree type of dynamic data structure, this paper proposes a non-repudiable dynamic provable data possession scheme (SB-NR-DPDP).
A. RELATED WORK
To solve the problem of users checking cloud data integrity, researchers have proposed a provable data possession (PDP) scheme. In 2007, Ateniese et al. [3] first proposed the PDP scheme. This scheme allows the user to randomly select several file blocks for verification without retrieving the entire outsourced file, which uses the probability of occurrence of the event to achieve provable data possession. However, the scheme only supports static operations on files by users, not dynamic operations. A drawback of this scheme is that the insert operation is not included in dynamic operations.
To support user dynamic operations and to improve the scheme's flexibility of the scheme, Ateniese et al. [4] proposed another PDP scheme in 2008 that supports dynamic operations. To this end, the researchers proposed a fully dynamic provable data possession scheme. For example, Wang et al. [5] proposed a dynamic PDP scheme based on the Merkle hash tree. It uses the leaf nodes of the MHT tree to store the hash value of the corresponding file block to update and verify the data. However, its disadvantage is that it needs to calculate a large number of hash values, so the calculation cost is high. Barsoum and Hasan [7] proposed a dynamic data PDP scheme based on an MVT table; its drawback is that a cloud return value tamper attack cannot be resisted. Yan et al. proposed a dynamic PDP scheme [1] ; its drawback is that it cannot resist a delete-insert attack. Because cloud service providers need to determine whether users actually rent cloud services, that is, only users who rent cloud storage can use cloud storage services. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) mechanism exists in the PDP scheme for complex key management and certificate maintenance.
To eliminate complex key and certificate management and to improve PDP scheme efficiency, Zhao et al. [8] proposed the first identity-based PDP scheme in 2013. The method is derived from the identity set signature developed by Gentry and Ramzan [9] , which only supports public verification data possession. In 2015, Wang [10] proposed the identity-based PDP scheme (ID-PDP), which not only supports public verification but also satisfies authorization and private verification. However, because it is not perfect, the cloud server can effectively prove data possession by only storing the hash value of the data block. In 2016, Wang et al. [11] proposed a new and improved ID-PDP scheme. However, because it could not resist malicious cloud server attacks, Lan et al. [12] proposed another new scheme. Zhao et al. [13] then proposed an identity-based provable data possession scheme that is an improvement on the ID-DPDP scheme to solve the malicious cloud server attack problem. However, the above solutions are all based on the perspective of user credibility so that users can avoid spoofing by untrusted cloud service providers, but there are cases where users are not trusted and deceive cloud service providers.
To solve the problem of user unreliability and improve the credibility of both parties in a PDP scheme, in 2014, Mo et al. [14] proposed a non-repudiation PDP scheme based on the Merkle hash tree and timestamps. It not only protects users from fraud by cloud service providers but also protects the interests of cloud service providers. However, the disadvantage is that the existence of timestamps may cause time synchronization problems. Wang [15] found that the existing dynamic data structure could not satisfy the non-repudiation feature of the PDP scheme very well. By introducing a logical index table (ILT), they proposed the non-repudiation and identity-based, non-repudiable dynamic PDP scheme (ID-NR-DPDP) in cloud storage. Although it is an excellent PDP scheme at present, it still has drawbacks: both users and cloud service providers need to maintain ILT tables. When user data files are large, storage overhead is high, and user data security is threatened once the table structure is stolen by an external attacker.
B. ORGANIZATION
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the system model. Section 3 introduces the preliminaries, including bilinear pairing, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, the discrete logarithm, and the Stern-Brocot tree. Section 4 analyses the dynamic operation algorithm of the Stern-Brocot tree. Section 5 shows our SB-NR-DPDP scheme in detail. Section 6 presents the security and performance analyses. Section 7 concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The main areas of basic knowledge are: bilinear pairing, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, and the Stern-Brocot tree.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Bilinear pairing [16] : Let G 1 be an additive group with the prime order q, let G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order q, and let g be a generator of G 1 . The map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear pairing if it can meet the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: The equation e (xQ, yQ) = e(Q, R) xy holds for any elements,Q, R ∈ G 1 , x, y ∈ Z * p . 2) Non-degeneracy: There are two elements Q, R ∈ G 1 , such that e(Q, R) = 1. 3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(Q, R) for any two elements.
B. DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY AGREEMENT
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman [17] . The purpose is to create a negotiation key for subjects A and B to communicate securely on insecure channels. First, A and B disclose the public parameters of the large prime numbers and the generators of group g. Next, A selects a random number, calculates it, sends it to B. B selects a random number, calculates it, and sends it to A. Finally, A and B calculate S = S c 1
c 2 mod p, respectively, to obtain the negotiation key.
C. DISCRETE LOGARITHM (DL) PROBLEM
The discrete logarithm (DL) problem is that, given g,g a ∈ G 1 , where g is the generator of multiplicative group G 1 with order p, the goal of the DL problem is computing a ∈ Z * q .
D. STERN-BROCOT TREE
The Stern-Brocot tree [18] is a binary tree used to construct a set consisting of all non-negative minimal fractions. It was discovered independently by German mathematician Moritz Stern and French watchmaker Achille Brocot. The tree is constructed by inserting a new fraction between two adjacent fractions; the numerator and denominator of the new fraction are the sum of the numerator and denominator of the left fraction and the right fraction, respectively. The left fraction is the parent closest to it, and the right fraction is the parent closest to it. Notice that all the nodes in the tree are fractions in the simplest form. For example, the partial SternBrocot tree structure shown in Figure 1 can be obtained from two fractions: (
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FIGURE 2. SB-NR-DPDP scheme model.
The Stern-Brocot tree has the following characteristics: -If we exclude 0/1 and 1/0, each fraction (rational number greater than zero) appears only once and in simplified form; -The fractions corresponding to each row of leaf nodes are monotonically increasing, and the larger fraction is displayed on the right side of the smaller fraction. -Each row of the tree is symmetric, and the values of the symmetric node fractions are reciprocal to each other. -Every layer of the tree is a full binary tree, so the height of the tree can be calculated by using the formula of the full binary tree.
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL AND FRAMEWORK

A. THE SYSTEM MODEL
An SB-NR-DPDP scheme model contains four primary entities: the private key generator (PKG), the data owner (User), the cloud server provider (CSP), and the unbiased judge. As shown in Fig. 2 , their functions are as follows.
-PKG: A trusted third party, which is called the private key generator. It can help users generate private keys. -User: The data owner who uses cloud storage services to outsource data to remote clouds. -Cloud server: A semi-trusted entity that stores and processes the user's data. It can prove data integrity to clients, but sometimes the cloud server can destroy data integrity and trick clients into believing that the data are still intact in the cloud. -Judge: A trusted third party that resolves disputes when they arise between the user and the cloud service provider.
B. THE SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
The SB-NR-DPDP scheme comprises six phases: Setup (initialization algorithm), Extraction (key generation algorithm), Tagging (tag generation algorithm), Processing (dynamic operation algorithm), Proof (evidence generation algorithm), Judgement (dispute resolution algorithm). 1) Setup: The algorithm is run by the PKG. This algorithm generates common system parameters and the master key by inputting security parameters. 2) Extraction: This algorithm is run by the PKG. The PKG generates a key sk c according to the client ID received. Similarly, the key sk s is generated for the cloud server. 3) Tagging: The user calculates the label for the data file and sends the label, data and data list to the cloud server. The cloud server checks the validity of the tags and data lists. When they are all valid, the cloud server returns the receipt to the user. After that, the user checks the validity of the receipt. Similarly, when valid, the client stores the data list and deletes the data and the corresponding label. 4) Processing: The user produces a new label and data list and sends it to the cloud server. The cloud server checks its validity, stores the new data and new data list, and returns the receipt to the user. The user checks the validity of the receipt; if valid, the user deletes the new data and stores the new data list and receipt. 5) Proof: The clients challenge the cloud server to respond accordingly, and the clients check the validity of the response, to judge the data possession. 6) Judgement: The judgement algorithm is executed by the judge. When a dispute occurs between the client and the cloud server, the user will send the latest receipt and the cloud service provider will send the latest challenge, response, user signature and other data to the judge. The judge will decide who wins or loses.
IV. THE DYNAMIC OPERATION ALGORITHM OF STERN-BROCOT TREE
The dynamic operation algorithm in the Stern-Brocot tree includes an insert, delete and modify algorithm. As shown in Fig. 3 . Users and the cloud server initialize the tree: the root node is 1 1 and is used to form a tree structure that is symmetric to the root node. The left child of the root node is N M , which is the seed node. The right child is M N . Using a seed, a Stern-Brocot tree with a symmetric root node can be established. As shown in Fig. 4 , all the fractions in the tree are in the simplest form.
The algorithm calculates the height of the tree that needs to be established according to the number of seeds and the number of data blocks n. Each leaf node in the tree corresponds to a unique pointer variable, and each pointer variable points to the user's corresponding data block F wx .
Insert algorithm: When data blocks F wx need to be inserted, an update from the most recent operation starts after the largest leaf node. The pointer variable wx corresponding to the appropriate insert block position is found. It then points to the file block F wx . The number of blocks is updated at the same time.
Deletion algorithm: To delete the correspondence between pointer variables and file blocks, the algorithm deletes the wx pointer to F wx , and lets wx = 1 as a failure node, that is, it adds wx as a global pointer variable for the dynamic operation algorithm. Finally, it updates the number of blocks at the same time, and n = n − 1. The purpose of marking the failure node is that when the tree is built again, wx conflicts with the global variable value, indicating that the position is the failure position. It continues to look for the insertion position to prevent a delete -insert attack. If the deleted position is at the last block, a new block will be inserted after the newly deleted position to avoid the delete -insert attack. When there are not enough leaves in the tree, a row will be generated again, and the global variable will be cleared after initialization.
Modify algorithm: First, it removes the relationship between the pointer variable wx and the file block F wx , and makes pointer variable value wx = 1. It then adds wx as a global pointer variable for the dynamic operation algorithm. Then, it follows the insertion algorithm to find pointer variable wx corresponding to the insertion location and points to modify the file.
For example, if the file is divided into 5 pieces, namely, seeds (2, 3) . Then, a Stern-Brocot tree with a height of h = 4 can be initialized as shown in Fig. 5 .
We first perform the insert block operation on the tree; for example, we want to insert the data block F w6 . Leaf nodes are not used up, so the inserted location is directly pointed to the inserted file block by the leaf pointer, as shown in Fig. 6 .
Assuming that we have inserted F w6 , F w7 , F w8 and that we want to insert block F w9 again, the leaf node will be full and we need to regenerate a row, as shown in Fig. 7 . Then, assume that the user wants to delete the block F w5 operation, as shown in Fig. 8 .
Finally, we want to modify block F w9 to block F w10 operation, as shown in Fig. 9 . 
V. SHOWS OUR SB-NR-DPDP SCHEME IN DETAIL
The SB-NR-DPDP scheme include six algorithms: Setup, Extraction, Tagging, Processing, Proof , and Judgement, which are described in detail in the following sections.
A. SETUP
This algorithm is executed by the PKG. Let G 1 , G 2 be a cyclic multiplication groups with prime order, and g be a generator of G 1 →{0, 1} log(θ) . The PKG then selects a random number c ∈ Z * q and computes C = c · g. The identity-based signature algorithm of Galindo and Garcia [19] where sign(sk ID , f ) → generates the signature for the message, and verify (ID, f , ) is used to verify the signature validity. PKG publishes the public parameters G g = {G 1 , G 2 , q, g, e, H , h, h 1 , C, π, φ, sign(), verify()} and keeps the msk = c secret.
B. EXTRACTION
The PKG selects a random number j ∈ R Z * q and computes R = j · g, Z = j + c · h(ID|R)mod q; therefore, sk ID = (R, Z ). The PKG uses this algorithm to generate the client's secret key, sk c , or the cloud server's secret key, sk s .
C. TAGGING
Given an F, the client chooses a random file name NI from some large domain and splits the file into n blocks, If it is invalid, the operation stops. Otherwise, the client stores {NI, n, (N, M) , s , c } and deletes data blocks and tags from local storage.
D. PROCESSING
• Insert: The client wants to insert a new block F . First, the client obtains the pointer variable wx corresponding to the new insertion location and the number of file blocks n by using the dynamic operation algorithm. Then, the file F is divided into s sections,F = (F 1 ||F 2 || . . .||F s ). The client computes the new label T wx and signature c , by using the
and c = sign(sk c , NI ||wx ||n). Next, the client uploads {F , T wx , U, n, c } to the cloud server. Then, the cloud server checks the validity T wx and c , by using the equations 1 = verify(ID c , U ||wx ||n, c ) and e T wx , g =
e(H NI | wx |U +
If one of them does not hold, the operation stops; otherwise, the cloud server updates n, c . Then, the signature s = sign(ID s , c ) is computed and s is returned as a receipt to the client. The client receives the receipt from the cloud server and then checks the validity of the receipt s by using the equation 1 = verify(ID s , s , c ). If it is invalid, the operation stops; otherwise, the client updates n, c , s , and deletes F , T wx from local storage.
• Delete: The client wants to delete block F wx . First, the client obtains the pointer variable wx corresponding to the delete location, and the number of file blocks n by using the dynamic operation algorithm. The client computes the signature c , by using the equation c = sign(sk c , NI | |U | |wx||n). Then, the client uploads {NI , U , n, wx, c } to the cloud server. Next, the cloud server checks the validity by using the equation 1 = verify(ID c , NI | |U | |wx||n, c ). If it holds, the cloud server updates n, c .Then, the signature s = sign(ID s , c ) is computed and s is returned as a receipt to the client. The client receives the receipt from the cloud server and then checks the validity of the receipt s by using the equation 1 = verify(ID s , s , c ) . If it is invalid, the operation stops; otherwise, the client updates n, c , s .
• Modify: The client wants to modify the file block value into F . First, the client obtains the pointer variable wx corresponding to the new insertion location of the new block by using the dynamic operation algorithm. Then, the file F is divided into s sections -F = (F 1 | F 2 | . . . ||F S ). The client computes the new label T wx and signature c , by using the equations T wx = Z c · (H NI | wx |U + s k=1 F k · u k ) and c = sign(sk c , NI | |U | |wx ||n). Then, the client uploads {F , T wx , NI , U , wx , n, c } to the cloud server. The cloud server checks the validity T wx and c , by using the equations 1 = verify(ID c , NI | |U | |wx ||n, c ) and
If one of them does not hold, the operation stops; otherwise, the cloud server updates c . Then, the signature s = sign(ID s , c ) is computed and s is returned as a receipt to the client. The client receives the receipt from the cloud server and checks the validity of the receipt s by using the equation 1 = verify(ID s , s , c ) . If it is invalid, the operation stops; otherwise, the client updates c , s , and deletes the file block and its labels.
E. PROOF
The client wants to verify the integrity of the file NI. First, the client selects a random number i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and s 1 , s 2 ∈ R Z * q . The client computes S 2 = s 2 · g, c = sign(sk c , NI | |s 1 | |S 2 ||i) and sends the challenge chal = i, s 1 , S 2 , NI , c to the cloud server. Upon receiving the challenge, the cloud server stops the dynamic operations of this file, selects
, and sends re = {S 3 , n, (N , M ) , F 1 , F 2 , . . . F s , T , s to the client as a response. Then, the client S 3 , n, (N , M ) , F 1 , F 2 , . . . F s , T , s to the client as a response. Then, the client computes S = s 2 · S 3 , Y = {y(π s 1 (ρ))|1 ≤ ρ ≤ i, a y = φ S (y), and y ∈ Y , and then checks the validity of response by using the equations e T , g = e( y∈Y a y ·H (NI | |y| |U )
. When the equations are true, the data are proven to be complete.
F. JUDGEMENT
When there is a dispute between the client and the cloud server, they each send the latest data information to the judge. The cloud server sends the latest chal = (i, s 1 , S 2 , NI , c ) and response re = S 3 , n, (N , M ) , wx , F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F s , T , s , s 3 , c to the judge. Then, the judge checks the validity of s . If it is invalid, the cloud server is the winner. Otherwise, the judge checks the validity of c and re. If one of them is winner, the client is the winner.
VI. PERFOMANCE ANALYSIS A. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
When the client sends file blocks and corresponding labels to the cloud server, the cloud server will verify the correctness of the data blocks and signatures by equation. Then, we will prove the correctness of corresponding equation in the following:
When the client challenges the cloud server, the cloud will give the proof of the challenged blocks. The client needs to check whether the proof is correct by equation. Then, we will prove the correctness of corresponding equation in the following:
B. SECURITY MODEL AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) SECURITY MODEL
In this part, we present the security model of SB-NR-DPDP schemes. This scheme is secure if it satisfies the following definition.
Tag-Unforgeability: A SB-NR-DPDP scheme provides Tag-Unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks if no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played between the adversary A and a challenger C.
Setup: The challenger C perform the setup algorithm to generate the system parameters Gg. Then, the challenger C VOLUME 7, 2019 runs the Extraction algorithm to get private/public key pairs sk ID = (R, Z ). Afterward, C sends G g and public key to A.
Queries: The adversary A could adaptively query private keys {ski}. It also could request signatures and lables. The challenge C runs the Tagging algorithm to generate a valid signature c and lable T wx . Further more, the challenger C sends them to the adversary A. Note that the adversary A performs this query with limited times.
Forge: The adversary A output a tuple (F , c , T wx ). Note that F did not appear in the Queries. The adversary A wins the game when the tuple (F , c , T wx ) is valid.
Proof-Unforgeability: A SB-NR-DPDP scheme provides Proof-Unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks if no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played between the adversary A and a challenger C.
Setup: The challenger C perform the setup algorithm to generate the system parameters G g . Then, the challenger C runs the Extraction algorithm to get private/public key pairs sk ID = (R, Z ). Afterward, C sends G g and public key to A.
Queries: The adversary A could adaptively query private keys {ski}. It also could request signatures and lables. The adversary A chooses a challenge message chal and sends it to the challenger C. The challenger C runs the proof algorithm and responds a valid proof message re and a signature s to the adversary A.
Forgery: The adversary A output valid proofs message re and signature c for challenge token chal , where chal did not appear in the Queries mentioned above, then the adversary A wins the game.
2) SECURITY ANALYSIS
This part we will talk about the security analysis of the SB-NR-DPDP scheme. The security of this scheme is based on the computing discrete logarithm (DL) assumption and the random oracle model [20] . The SB-NR-DPDP scheme provides Tag-unforgeability and Proof-unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks.
• Forgery of Tag: Setup: The challenger C perform the setup algorithm to get private/public key pairs. Then, the challenger C sends the public system key and parameters G g to A.
Queries: Query 1: On receiving the query with sk i , the challenger C searches a pair (ID i , sk i ) in the list L1. If such a pair is found, C returns ski to A. Otherwise, it returns sk i to A and inserts the pair (ID i , sk i ) in the list L1. − j * )/h(ID * ||j * .g) with a non-negligible probability which contradicts the computing DL assumption.
• Forgery of Proof: Setup and first queries are same as the Tag-Forge game's parts. The following query that the adversary A chooses a challenge message chal = i, s 1 , S 2 , NI , c and sends it to the challenger C. The challenger C runs the proof algorithm and responds a valid proof message re = {S 3 , n, (N , M ) ,
Challenge: The challenge C generates challenge token chal = i , s 1 , S 2 , NI , c where at least one NI and at least one c not appeared in the queries.
Forgery: Finally, A itself output a valid proof message re = {S 3 , n , (N , M ) ,
with a non-negligible probability which contradicts the computing DL assumption. In our scheme, to prevent the delete-insert attack, the deletion position is marked as the invalid position so that the new insert file block label cannot be replaced by the delete file block. Therefore, it can resist the delete-insert attack. The generation of validation tags is generated by the storage file, rather than by the corresponding hash value of the storage file. Therefore, our scheme can resist the hash value attack of a malicious cloud. This scheme adopts Diffie-Hellman key agreement to generate negotiation keys for the client and the cloud server. Since an adversary would not know this key, he or she could not generate the response to the client. Therefore, our scheme can resist this type of attack. Those attacks have been described in scheme [15] , so we will not repeat them here. When the client has a dispute with the cloud server, the judge will resolve the dispute and determine who wins. In this scheme, the leaf-node value of the Stern-Brocot tree is monotonically increasing. Therefore, our scheme is also non-repudiable since it uses this property of the Stern-Brocot tree to distinguish the sequence of operations. Because the client and the cloud server do not need to save the tree structure, and relies on the number of file blocks n, the seed (N, M) of the Stern-Brocot tree, and the dynamic operation algorithm, the corresponding tree structure can be constructed and operated dynamically. Therefore, this scheme has better security.
C. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform an efficiency analysis of the storage and computational overhead of the scheme, and compare it with two of the best alternative schemes. Let T H , T add , T mul , T p , T exp denote the running time of a hash function instruction, an addition instruction in G 1 , a multiplication instruction, a bilinear pairing instruction, and an exponentiation instruction. The PRF, PRP and other operations are omitted in our evaluation, because their computational costs are negligible. Suppose the data are split into n blocks. Each block of data is divided into s parts, and the number of challenge blocks is c. Table 1 presents the comparisons between our scheme and two other schemes [1] , [15] .
1) CALCULATION OVERHEAD
from table 1, we can see that our scheme's computational overhead is the same as scheme [15] , so the computational cost is mainly compared with scheme [1] . in the first part, we evaluate the client cost in the tag generation phase. in our scheme, the main computational overhead for the client at this phase is the generation of the tag and signature, so it uses (ns + 2) T mul + nsT add + (n + 1)T hash . scheme [1] uses nst mul + nT hash +n (s + 1) T exp . our scheme is more efficient because we use a bilinear pairing operation with less computational overhead instead of using exponential operations, and the time expended by T h , T add , T mul , T p is less than T exp . on the other hand, we can see that when the value of n is fixed, the computational cost of the two schemes is linear with the number of s. moreover, as the s grows, the growth rate of tag generation computational overhead in scheme [1] is significantly higher than ours. therefore, our scheme reduces the client's computational overhead in the client tag generation phase.
In the second part, we separately evaluate the computational cost of the two schemes in the cloud server to produce proof and for the client verification certificate process. Scheme [1] uses (2c − 1) T mul + (c − 1) T add + cT exp and (c + s − 1) T mul + cT hash + (c + s+1)T exp . Our scheme uses (2c + 4) T mul + (c − 1) T add + T hash , and (c + s + 4) T mul + (c + s + 2) T add +3T hash +T p . Though comparison, we found that the computational overhead of our scheme is reduced, so our scheme is more efficient.
2) STORAGE OVERHEAD
In scheme [15] , due to the introduction of the ilt table structure, both the clients and the cloud server need to maintain the table to achieve dynamic storage and non-repudiation of the scheme. fig. 10 shows the storage overhead when the ilt table contains up to 1 million records. the storage size of the ilt table is related to the data file size, because the data list records the latest updates for all data blocks. each tuple in the ilt table consists of index number (in) and logic number (cn). they need a total of 20 bits. when the record reaches 10,000, the list takes up more than 20 kb. when the record reaches 1 million, the record takes up more than 2 mb. since both schemes [1] , [15] need to maintain the table structure, the scheme, the clients and cloud server do not need to maintain the table structure, and the storage overhead is fixed. only the number of data blocks n and the seed of the tree can be stored, and the storage overhead is independent of the file size. for this reason, the storage overhead of our scheme is significantly lower than that of the schemes [1] , [15] , which reduces the storage overhead of the clients and the cloud server.
VII. SUMMARY
Cloud storage causes data owners to lose physical control over their outsourced files. The provable data possession (PDP) scheme allows clients to check cloud data integrity in an efficient way. We introduced a new dynamic data structure Stern-Brocot tree and proposed the SB-NR-DPDP scheme. The scheme enables the clients and the cloud server to dynamically manipulate outsourced files, making the PDP scheme more suitable for practical application. The program supports identity authentication, enabling the PDP solution to eliminate complex certificate management. The program supports non-repudiation and solves the disputes between the client and the cloud server. This scheme can resist adaptive chosen-message attacks, hash value attacks, delete-insert attacks, and tamper with cloud return value attacks. As such, it has superior security and high efficiency. In terms of future work, we will improve the scheme to support multi-user operations and batch auditing.
